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Summary
Since 1991, 28 states have enacted laws that prohibit
insurers’ use of genetic information in pricing, issuing,
or structuring health insurance. This article evaluates
whether these laws reduce the extent of genetic discrim-
ination by health insurers. From the data collected at
multiple sites, we find that there are almost no well-
documented cases of health insurers either asking for or
using presymptomatic genetic test results in their un-
derwriting decisions, either (a) before or after these laws
have been enacted or (b) in states with or without these
laws. By using both in-person interviews with insurers
and a direct market test, we found that a person with
a serious genetic condition who is presymptomatic faces
little or no difficulty in obtaining health insurance. Fur-
thermore, there are few indications that the degree of
difficulty varies according to whether a state regulates
the use of genetic information. Nevertheless, these laws
have made it less likely that insurers will use genetic
information in the future. Although insurers and agents
are only vaguely aware of these laws, the laws have
shaped industry norms and attitudes about the legiti-
macy of using this information.
Introduction
Over half of the states have imposed sweeping restric-
tions on health insurers’ use of genetic information
(Rothenberg 1995; Davis and Mitrius 1996; Yesley
1997; Mulholland and Jaeger 1999). Similar legislation
has been pending in Congress for several years (Colby
1998). Also, in 1996, a federal law known as “HIPAA”
(Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act)
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prohibited group health insurers from applying pre-
existing condition exclusions to genetic conditions that
are indicated solely by genetic tests and not by any actual
symptoms (Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act 1996). This wave of legislation was prompted
by a number of reported cases of employers and of
health, life, and disability insurers using newfound ge-
netic information to deny coverage, raise rates, or limit
the extent of coverage (Billings et al. 1992; Alper et al.
1994; Hudson et al. 1995; Geller et al. 1996). Fear of
genetic discrimination of this sort was shown to factor
strongly into patients’ and family members’ decisions
and concerns about undergoing genetic testing (Lapham
et al. 1996). These laws are thus intended to achieve
two kinds of social benefit: (1) to prevent unfair use of
genetic information, however accurate that use might be
as a source of underwriting information; and (2) to en-
courage more genetic testing for purposes of research,
prevention, treatment, and family planning. This article
evaluates only the first objective.
Several distinctive features of these laws must be con-
sidered in assessing their purpose and intended effects.
First, they typically do not prohibit the use of genetic
information from any and all sources. Instead, they usu-
ally target only information derived from genetic tests.
Thus, many states still allow insurers to consider family
history of disease, and they allow insurers to underwrite
on the basis of observed clinical signs and symptoms of
medical conditions, regardless of their genetic status. Al-
though a number of states also include information
about genetic conditions derived from family history,
almost every state prohibits only information about pre-
symptomatic genetic conditions.
The reasons are partly pragmatic, and partly central
to the law’s purpose (Hall 1996, 1999). Because health
insurers have always used symptoms of existing disease
in medical underwriting, it would not be feasible and is
unjustified to distinguish between diseases with and
without significant genetic components. One would ei-
ther have to prohibit all medical underwriting, which
cannot be done as long as the purchase of health insur-
ance is voluntary, or to target only specific sources of
information. Information from genetic tests is the sen-
sible point of concern because that is where the fear of
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Table 1
Classification of Study States
Classification State(s)
Mature laws Colorado, Minnesota, Ohio
Recent laws New Mexico, Florida, North Carolinaa
No laws Iowa
a North Carolina was used to field-test interview
guides and techniques.
insurance discrimination has the greatest discernible im-
pact. Thus, these laws are meant to prohibit health in-
surers from predicting future health problems that do
not currently exist, usually on the basis of genetic test
information alone, but sometimes also on the basis of
family history. This study is designed to assess how well
these laws have accomplished this goal, and whether
they have caused any harm.
Although there is fairly wide agreement on what ge-
netic discrimination means (Billings et al. 1992; Yesley
1998), there are substantial differences of opinion on
how to apply this definition. The researchers who have
documented genetic discrimination consider genetic con-
ditions to be presymptomatic if the condition is mild
and the symptoms do not require active treatment, or if
the symptoms are more serious but they are being ef-
fectively controlled through treatment. These are clearly
cases, however, where patients have been given diag-
noses suggesting they currently have the diseases, and
therefore such patients do not fit our concept of pre-
symptomatic. In this study, we use presymptomatic to
mean genetic conditions that are entirely unexpressed,
such as predisposition to cancer that has not yet oc-
curred, or presence of the mutation for Huntington dis-
ease but without expressed symptoms. There is also def-
initional uncertainty over which kinds of tests are genetic
(Alper and Beckwith 1998). This uncertainty, however,
did not affect our analysis and, interestingly, was not
raised by any of our subjects as a practical point of
concern.
Material and Methods
This is a comparative case-study analysis done in seven
states that were selected to pair similar states with and
without laws prohibiting health insurers’ use of genetic
information. Because legislative activity was ongoing
throughout this study, the initial selection and pairing
was not wholly successful. Three states initially classified
as lacking these laws adopted them in 1997, the year
after this study was designed. The focus across all of the
states is whether practices and perceptions differ before
and after enactment of these laws. Groupings of states
were compared according to whether they have mature
laws (enacted in 1995 or earlier), recent laws (enacted
in 1997), or no law (table 1).
In each of these primary study states, we systemati-
cally interviewed representatives from the Department
of Insurance, most of the major health insurers, most of
the major centers for clinical genetics, and from three
to six insurance agents specializing in health insurance.
In each category, subjects with the greatest relevant
knowledge and experience were selected. Within de-
partments of insurance, these were either people in
charge of public policy, legislation, or compliance.
Among insurers, these were actuaries or underwriters
for individual (nongroup) and small group insurance
products. Agents were selected by contacting profes-
sional trade groups and asking for independent brokers
who have specialized in health insurance for a number
of years. Within the medical genetics community, we
interviewed mainly experienced genetic counselors
working with adult-onset genetic conditions such as can-
cer or Huntington disease, but also including those in
pediatric or prenatal genetic counseling. In all, we in-
terviewed 12 regulators, 35 people with 23 insurers, 30
insurance agents, and 29 genetic counselors or medical
geneticists. We also interviewed five patient advocates
and one medical director from a genetic testing firm.
The insurers represented in this interview pool account
for over half, and sometimes the vast majority of, the
individual and small group health insurance markets in
each of the study states. Included are a fairly equal bal-
ance among different types of insurers: seven local Blue
Cross plans, six local and two national HMOs, and
seven national commercial indemnity insurers.
Most of these interviews were conducted in-person
and lasted ˜1 h. Some agent interviews were conducted
over the telephone and some interviews lasted only
15–30 min or were conducted with groups of two to
four subjects. Although these semistructured in-depth
interviews were based on an interview guide, free-rang-
ing discussions occurred and the coverage of topics var-
ied somewhat among them. Interview subjects gave in-
formed consent and were promised anonymity.
A market testing study was conducted to determine
the ability of a fictitious small employer and an un-
healthy individual to obtain group and nongroup in-
surance, following a scripted scenario. An employer with
three employees (including herself) contacted 17–18
agents in each of the primary study states to inquire
about the availability of health insurance for the group
of three, as well as for a group of two plus individual
coverage for one employee. The owner of the company,
according to the scenario, volunteered that she had
tested positive for the breast cancer gene. The un-
healthy employee had juvenile diabetes, according to
the scenario, and the employer was prepared to disclose,
if asked, that this employee also has a family history of
Alzheimer disease (the Alzheimer information was not
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volunteered). To avoid violating insurance fraud laws,
no actual application forms were submitted. The market
testing firm only held one or two phone conversations
in which the agent was asked for preliminary informa-
tion about available products, rate quotes, and an in-
dication of whether the various health conditions would
present any difficulty.
We gathered from agents and insurers a selection of
148 application forms from 50 insurers for individual
and small group health insurance. Through content anal-
ysis, we determined both the level of compliance with
genetic discrimination laws and the level of inquiry
about genetic information in states without these laws
and prior to having these laws. Most of these forms are
dated 1995 or later, but a few come from the early 1990s.
For most insurers, several forms were examined to cover
a range of products, states, and years. (Application forms
often vary in minor details from state to state.) Various
other sources of documentary information were col-
lected and examined, including underwriting guidelines
used by health insurers; informed consent forms and
patient information brochures used by medical geneti-
cists; published articles in academic journals and the
popular press about genetic discrimination; and unpub-
lished studies based on surveys done at genetic clinics.
These multiple sources of information and data were
analyzed by using both qualitative and quantitative
techniques.
Results
The View from Medical Genetics
We first assess the views of genetic counselors about
the extent of insurance discrimination. Genetic coun-
selors are in an excellent position to report on insurance
discrimination (Kenen 1984; Bowles-Biesecker 1998).
Discrimination concerns are frequently a focus of coun-
selors’ discussions with patients and families, their cli-
ents readily report troubles they face with health insur-
ance at the time of testing, most counselors said they
stay in touch with their clients following testing that
shows positive (adverse) results, and their clients are
prone to contact them even several years later if they
encounter difficulties as a consequence of test results. A
few counselors, however, said they would not have rea-
son to know if clients experienced discrimination after
leaving the clinic.
Of the 29 counselors and five patient advocates in-
terviewed, the great majority said they believe or they
have read or have heard that insurance discrimination
occurs to a significant extent for adult patients with pre-
symptomatic adverse genetic profiles. They characterize
insurance discrimination as a matter of great concern,
which they think is widespread or not at all uncommon.
They base this view on what they hear at professional
meetings or what they read in professional journals.
When asked about instances of insurance discrimination
with their own clients or those of their colleagues, how-
ever, almost every counselor and every patient advocate
said he or she knew of no actual cases of health insurance
discrimination that were classified in the way that we
used for the purposes of this study. Approximately half
had no examples to offer of any type of insurance dis-
crimination, however defined or classified, and said this
simply had not been an issue for their clients. Four coun-
selors and one physician with considerable experience
said they think the concern over genetic discrimination
is greatly exaggerated. Witness these two experienced
counselors:
Counselor 1: [After describing a case of a person
whose health insurance rates increased because of a fam-
ily history of Huntington disease, turns to Counselor 2,
and says:] “You don’t have any cases that you know
of?”
Counselor 2: “No, I don’t have any. It’s a concern
that has been brought up in our counseling, but I do
not have any documented cases such as that.”
Counselor 1: “The deal is, other than this one case,
there really aren’t any, I don’t think it is a really big
problem. I think it’s an issue, but I think on the scale
of all of the things that people have to deal with, I don’t
think it’s rampant. I don’t know if that is because in-
surance companies haven’t figured it out or if it really
isn’t a big problem. I’m unclear about that. I think it’s
a hot topic and that’s where that is. [Counselor 2 has]
had more experience. Cancer is different.”
Counselor 2: “. . . It hasn’t been documented for can-
cer anywhere, I’m not aware of any documentation in
the medical literature for a cancer family that has been
discriminated against.”
Some counselors gave examples of patients who had
trouble getting insurance because of a family history of
genetic disease. Most of these also involved situations
where there were other clinical indications of existing
genetic disease and so were not presymptomatic or
purely predictive. Many counselors could only give ex-
amples of patients who had trouble getting their insurer
to pay for genetic counseling, testing, or preventative
services. This was the dominant focus of concern in
many of our interviews. Finally, we were given discrim-
ination examples relating to life, disability, or long-term
care insurance, or to employment, but not to health
insurance.
We heard of only two examples that are somewhat
close to the type of genetic discrimination addressed by
the health insurance laws. In both instances, a patient
asked an insurer to pay for genetic counseling (for cancer
testing in one case and Huntington disease in the other),
and the insurer subsequently raised their rates, merely
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Table 2
Difficulty in Obtaining Small-Group Health Insurance, for Various Conditions
Situation Responses among 105 Agents
Juvenile diabetes 3% of agents indicated coverage is unavailable; 25% of agents indicated some difficulty
Breast cancer gene 0% of agents indicated coverage is unavailable; 13% of agents indicated some difficulty
Family history of Alzheimer disease No inquiry by agents
on the basis of suspicion of a genetic disorder or the
possibility they might take the test, without regard to
the actual results of the test. Whether this runs afoul of
the state law depends on the precise wording of the
relevant statutes. It appears to be more akin to discrim-
ination based on family history, which many states do
not prohibit, than based on genetic testing, because only
those with a family history have reason to request these
tests. This does not lessen the impact of the discrimi-
nation, but it means that we were not able to document
from genetic counselors that there was any nonambi-
guous occurrence prior to or after the laws’ enactment
of the type of discrimination clearly prohibited by most
state laws.
Narrowing our focus to precisely this type of discrim-
ination might be criticized for missing the fact that these
laws are allowing other types of genetic discrimination
to continue that are more prevalent. However, most of
the instances of discrimination in underwriting that we
documented either do not relate to health insurance
(three cases) or are based on symptoms of existing dis-
ease (six cases). Only the presymptomatic family history
cases are fairly classified as discrimination based solely
on genetic information. We heard of four such cases,
and two are cases in which health insurers’ initial adverse
use of family history was corrected with genetic test re-
sults that showed absence of the genetic defect. Thus,
even if the category of genetic discrimination is expanded
to include family history cases, we were able to docu-
ment only two such cases, and we observed an equal or
greater number of cases discussed as follows in which
genetic test results were used to resolve health insurance
problems based on family history.
The View from the Insurance Industry
To learn the extent of genetic discrimination from
within the insurance industry, we interviewed regulators,
independent agents, and reliable sources at insurance
companies. In each case, there was a consistent view that
genetic information is not used in underwriting for
health insurance.
Regulators.—All of the regulators we interviewed said
they could remember no complaints or could document
no instances of genetic discrimination by health insurers.
These subjects conveyed the attitude that genetics simply
is not on their radar screen of significant issues in health
insurance. Many regulators had no idea what the im-
petus for the legislation was in their state. Others said
the legislation was prompted by a generalized concern
to avoid possible discrimination and not in response to
any actual cases of discrimination. None of the regu-
lators knew of any cases or history of genetic discrim-
ination occurring prior to the law’s enactment, even
though, in at least two of these states, a task force or
group of advocates devoted extensive efforts to finding
evidence of discrimination.
Agent interviews and market testing study.—Insurance
agents are a highly credible source because they are in-
dependent brokers who are paid by commission and well
situated and highly motivated to advocate for coverage
of their clients and detect any adverse insurer behavior.
None of the 30 agents we interviewed could recall any
instances of health insurers using genetic test informa-
tion. Several commented that insurers sometimes use
family history information to interpret diagnoses of cur-
rent conditions, or they remembered instances where cli-
ents were treated as having a genetic disease from their
symptoms. But none could remember genetic test results
ever having played a role in an underwriting decision.
In the direct market test, various aspects of a prepared
scenario generated little indication of potential genetic
discrimination (table 2). The only difficulty encountered
was on account of the individual employee with existing
diabetes. Three percent of agents indicated that includ-
ing the diabetic employee would prevent the three-per-
son group from obtaining coverage, and 25% said this
would present some difficulty, such as increased rates or
decreased coverage. For presymptomatic conditions, no
agent asked about family history of any disease, so the
Alzheimer information in the scenario never came to
light. When information was volunteered that one per-
son had tested positive for the breast cancer gene, none
of the agents indicated this would present a great deal
of difficulty, and all of the agents indicated that small-
group insurance would still be available (either for a
group of two or a group of three) (table 2).
However, 13% of these agents indicated that the
breast cancer gene might present some unspecified dif-
ficulty, such as increasing the rate somewhat or being
subject to a temporary or permanent exclusion of that
condition. The testing firm did not record the nature of
the difficulty, and it recorded some indication of diffi-
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Table 3





Community rating (New York, Vermont) 5
Mature genetics law (Connecticut, Minnesota, Ohio) 14
New genetics law (Florida, New Mexico) 3
No genetics law (Iowa) 33a
New or no genetics law (Florida, Iowa, New Mexico) 13
Any genetics law (Connecticut, Florida, Minnesota, New Mexico, Ohio) 9
All states studied 11
NOTE.—For most states, 18 agents were contacted.
a Statistically significant difference ( ) from community-rating states, states with new geneticsP ! .01
law, and states with any genetics law.
culty even if the agent was unsure or the degree of dif-
ficulty indicated was slight. It is often impossible to
know for sure how much difficulty a health issue pres-
ents until an application is submitted for full under-
writing, which was not done here. It is important to
observe that this focus on the breast cancer gene was
only in the context of small-group insurance, not indi-
vidual insurance, and that this market test was done after
enactment of the 1997 federal law that prohibited in-
surers in all states from declining coverage to small
groups for any health-related reason. Thus, even though
this small group had only three members, altering the
scenario to a one-person inquiry might have produced
a greater indication of possible genetic discrimination.
Whatever difficulty does exist for very small groups,
it does not vary according to the type of state law—with
one exception. Table 3 displays the degree of difficulty
presented by the breast-cancer mutation, organized by
various state groupings, to reveal possible differences
related to the legal environment. For this purpose, we
include two other states, New York and Vermont, which
also do not have genetic discrimination laws for health
insurance, but which prohibit medical underwriting of
any kind for both individual and small group health
insurance. Thus, the laws in these two states are even
more protective than those that ban only the use of pre-
symptomatic genetic test information (table 3).
It should be noted that community rating states per-
formed as well as or better than states with genetic dis-
crimination laws, although the differences are not sta-
tistically significant. For reasons noted earlier, Iowa is
the only study state without either a genetics law or
community rating, and there the level of difficulty is
substantially greater than for states with these laws
( ). However, when Iowa is combined with statesP ! .01
where the genetics law was enacted the same year as our
study, this difference disappears. There is virtually the
same level of difficulty in states with mature genetics
laws as in those with no or new laws. There are several
reasons that this is a valid, and probably more repre-
sentative, comparison than comparing only Iowa with
the other states. First, the states with new genetic laws
have the lowest difficulty of all, which is anomalous
unless the publicity of the new law affected agents’ at-
titudes. However, as discussed later, most of the agents
in our interviews (which is a different sampling of agents
than the market test) did not know about these laws,
and although the proportion of those who did was some-
what higher in states with new than with mature laws,
none of the agents in the market testing study indicated
any awareness of these laws, although they were not
specifically asked. Even if they were aware, the real in-
quiry here is insurers’ actual behavior, as reflected
through the impressions and expectations of agents. For
this purpose, the comparison between states with mature
genetics laws and those without is more meaningful,
because only states with mature laws have an oppor-
tunity for agents to establish an experience base under
these laws. Finally, to the extent the apparent difference
among mature, new, and no-law states is real, this dif-
ference is driven by the new-law states and so will likely
dissipate as laws in those states become more mature.
Thus, the observed effect between states with and with-
out these laws may be short-lived, at best.
Industry self-reports.—We spoke to actuaries and un-
derwriters who work with individual and small group
products, which are the products that require the most
intensive examination of medical records. Uniformly, we
heard that all branches of the industry—Blue Cross
plans, HMOs, and commercial indemnity plans—do not
inquire about genetic test results, do not have a practice
of using this information if they come across it in the
medical record, and do not include this type of infor-
mation in their underwriting guidelines. This was the
case both before and after these laws were enacted, and
both in states with and without these laws. No insurer
subject said that their medical underwriting practices
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relating to genetics were in any way different prior to
these laws.
These subjects insisted that, for both business and
moral reasons, they are firmly opposed to using pre-
symptomatic genetic test information. Several said this
is flatly contrary to their philosophy of proper medical
underwriting, which is to focus only on conditions that
presently or previously existed, or that it would be eth-
ically wrong to penalize people for genetic defects that
haven’t yet manifested. Others said they are concerned
about the political or public relations backlash that
would result from using this type of information, which
would be hard to justify because of others’ understand-
able moral or philosophical objections. Still others said
the issue simply hasn’t come up in any discussions, at
any level they are aware of within the company.
Industry practices and sources of information.—The
strongest confirmation of the credibility of these industry
sources comes from two directions: an independent re-
view of the sources and types of information actually
collected by insurers, and a convincing explanation of
why it is not cost effective to use genetic test results in
underwriting. A content analysis of health insurance ap-
plication forms from 50 insurers found only 2 (4%)
potentially asking for genetic test results specifically. One
is a commercial indemnity insurer with an extremely
detailed application form, which includes one question
that reads: Do you have a mental or physical impairment
or deformity, or a congenital or hereditary abnormality,
disease or trait not previously disclosed?
We observed this insurer using this question mainly
in states without a genetic discrimination statute at the
time, although the form appeared to be in use in one
state, New Mexico, shortly after the law was enacted
there. We saw one other example of this type of question
in a state with such a law, North Carolina, also shortly
after the law was passed. Curiously, this question was
used by the small group purchasing cooperative, which
otherwise engages in very lenient medical underwriting.
Everyone associated with the organization we asked was
puzzled by why this question is included.
On its surface, this question is ambiguous as to
whether it requires the disclosure of presymptomatic,
predictive genetic test results. Congenital or hereditary
abnormality or disease clearly speaks to existing con-
ditions, such as birth defects. However, trait conceiv-
ably refers to mere carrier status or unexpressed disease
potential. It is debatable whether this is the necessary
meaning. If not, an applicant might be justified in not
disclosing such test results, even in response to this ques-
tion. Agents explained that they are very careful to ad-
vise clients about how to provide as little damaging in-
formation as possible in response to ambiguous
questions on the application. Another reason these two
instances of genetic-specific questions do not refute the
indications that insurers do not seek out or use this in-
formation is that knowledgeable and credible sources at
these two organizations, when asked, were not aware
these questions were on their application forms. They
did not think the information gathered would be used
to predict future health problems, but rather to help
diagnose present conditions, consistent with practices in
the rest of the industry.
We heard repeatedly from agents, insurers, and reg-
ulators that using genetic information to predict the on-
set of future health conditions makes no sense for health
insurance because of the short time-frame of reference
that typically is used in medical underwriting. Under-
writers try to assess only existing or prior health prob-
lems based on recent health care utilization because these
are the most predictive of likely health care costs in the
immediate future. One agent explained that, for small
group insurance, they do a cursory review and they’ll
look for something that’s a full-blown case of AIDS or
somebody who’s got something that’s obviously ongoing
and a current concern. They don’t try to predict like
Methuselah what kind of health care utilization you’re
going to have in the future.
Near-term medical expenses are the dominant focus
as these can be predicted with more certainty, because
over time those who begin as higher or lower risks tend
to regress to the mean by natural laws of probability
and because few people keep the same health insurance
for extended periods of time. On the latter point, both
individual and small group insurers reported a very rapid
turn-over in enrollment. The average or predicted length
of enrollment was variously estimated at 2–4 years by
most insurers, and several estimated that 90% of sub-
scribers will change insurers within 7–10 years. For these
reasons, insurers do not consider it very relevant or
worth the effort to predict health expenditures 5, 10, or
more years into the future for specific enrollees. This is
especially true for relatively rare conditions. Conversely,
because sick people are very reluctant to change insur-
ance, those who remain the longest are likely to be the
highest risks (M. A. Hall, unpublished data).
Strong confirmation of health underwriters’ lack of
interest in presymptomatic, predictive genetic testing
comes from the present use of family history informa-
tion. Some insurers clearly do use family history infor-
mation for important disease categories such as heart
disease, cancer, and diabetes, but they do so only to look
for or evaluate other signs of existing or prior disease,
not to predict the onset of future health problems. Five
of 23 insurers we interviewed, and 3 of ∼30 others for
whom we gathered application forms, inquire about
family history information in some fashion. Notably,
these insurers were spread fairly evenly across segments
of the industry: one Blue Cross plan, three HMOs, and
four commercial indemnity insurers. Eight of 28 agents
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recall such questions being asked on health insurance
applications. A typical application asks Do you or your
spouse have any biological parent or sibling who has
been diagnosed with cancer or heart disease? One in-
surer asks about both parents and grandparents, and
about any family history of tuberculosis, diabetes, high
blood pressure, kidney disease, mental illness, and sui-
cide, in addition to cancer and heart disease.
Agents, insurers, and regulators all said, however, that
fewer insurers are asking for this information, that it is
usually not used in any fashion even when obtained, or
that it is being used somewhat less often. This trend is
occurring mainly for pragmatic, not legal, reasons. A
number of agents and underwriters were surprised to
learn that family history questions were, in fact, asked
on their forms and could not think of any situations
where the information had a role in medical under-
writing decisions. Those who were more familiar with
the use of this information said that it is not used to
predict future health problems that currently do not ex-
ist, as occurs with life insurance. Instead, family history
of disease serves only as a red flag for further inves-
tigation of a current or previous health problem that has
gone undetected, or as a tie-breaker in borderline sit-
uations. This limitation in use derives both from estab-
lished industry practice and from regulators’ resistance
to using this information in a purely predictive fashion.
Several subjects noted that regulators would reject using
family history in any other way, not because of the recent
genetics laws, but on basic principles of permissible med-
ical underwriting for health insurance.
For instance, a 55-year-old person who is overweight
and hasn’t been to a doctor in a long time might be
required, on the basis of a family history of diabetes, to
undergo blood sugar testing or a medical examination
to rule out existing but undiagnosed diabetes. Similar
decisions might be made for heart disease. Or, the health
risk of someone with high blood pressure might be eval-
uated differently in a borderline situation based on the
presence or absence of a strong family history of heart
trouble. But family history information, no matter how
strong, is not used to predict the future onset of disease.
Only one person, with a Blue Cross plan, said that family
history standing alone might be used to increase rates
slightly, perhaps 1%–2% in a very strong case, but this
person was a medical director, not an underwriter, and
others at the same insurer said this was not done.
The potential for genetic discrimination.—Although
insurers do not now ask for genetic testing information
directly, it is possible, unless prohibited by law, to obtain
this information from various sources (Kass 1997; Stone
1997). Insurers could learn about genetic testing from
more generic questions about medical visits and diag-
nostic testing, or from examining medical records or
claims for reimbursement. Therefore, we asked health
insurers whether, if they happen to learn of positive (ad-
verse) genetic test results, would they use this infor-
mation in medical underwriting in any fashion, even if
the information is entirely presymptomatic or predictive
and not diagnostic of current symptoms or conditions.
We sometimes asked this question in a general fashion,
but we also frequently posed a specific hypothetical, in-
volving breast cancer. We asked what insurers would do
if legally permitted to consider information that a
woman tested positive for the breast cancer gene and
she was 15 years younger than the predicted age at onset.
Approximately half (8 of 17) of insurers who re-
sponded to the general inquiry and approximately two-
thirds (10 of 14) of those who responded to the breast
cancer example conceded that they might or probably
would use such information in some fashion, if legally
permitted to do so. Also, four of six insurers said that,
in the future, it is likely that so much more genetic in-
formation will exist and predictive data will be so much
more precise that genetic test results probably will be
much more relevant to medical underwriting than now.
These subjects thought that, whether this information
will be used is largely a cost/benefit business decision,
in response to market forces. Agents gave similar re-
sponses. Ten of 15 agents said insurers might or would
use genetic information in some fashion if legal and it
came to their attention, and 2 of 4 said use of this in-
formation is likely some time in the future.
Many of the insurers were much more tentative, say-
ing they were not sure whether any genetic information
would be relevant now, and they would consult their
medical director and legal department first before using
it. Others said the breast cancer information would have
only marginal impact, for instance, raising rates only
1%–2%, depending on the probabilities indicated by
existing data. Of the eight agents who were asked the
breast cancer question, only two thought insurers would
find this genetic information relevant, and in the market
testing study, only 11% of agents indicated a 35-year-
old person with the breast cancer gene might face some
(unspecified) difficulty in medical underwriting for
small-group insurance. However, some underwriters said
the breast cancer example would be a basis for ridering
out or waivering that condition, not as a generic pre-
existing condition, but through a specific contractual
exclusion of that particular condition. This is usually
permissible for individual insurance.
In justifying their possible use of presymptomatic ge-
netic test results, several insurers noted that even the
breast cancer example is not wholly irrelevant to current
health care costs. Someone with the breast cancer gene
is certain to receive more intensive cancer screening, and
may well be a candidate for prophylactic mastectomy.
If subscribers expect to be reimbursed for these costs,
some insurers insisted that it is only fair they be allowed
300 Am. J. Hum. Genet. 66:293–307, 2000
to consider the results of the genetic tests that prompt
these medical costs, even though the person does not
currently have the condition. It was also noted that ob-
taining reimbursement for these preventive services
places physicians and patients in a difficult situation.
Only existing medical conditions and not preventive
services are covered under conventional indemnity in-
surance. Therefore, it is necessary to declare that a ge-
netic predisposition is an existing condition, much like
someone with high blood pressure or cholesterol levels,
to claim reimbursement. But, once doing this, it is in-
consistent to say that no condition exists for under-
writing purposes.
This led us to make additional inquiries. First, we
asked whether insurers would regard someone with a
genetic predisposition who had not received treatment
as having a condition that could be excluded under a
generic preexisting condition exclusion. We were con-
sistently told no, both because of HIPAA, and because
of generally prevailing concepts of what constitutes a
preexisting condition. If a genetic condition has received
some preventive treatment, however, half of the insurer
and agent subjects asked this question said that it would
or might be considered an excluded preexisting condi-
tion. This suggests a significant ambiguity in the HIPAA
provision. Also, one insurer noted that, although its con-
tracts do not exclude preexisting conditions, it insists
that all such conditions be disclosed in the application
form, so a failure to disclose a genetic condition that has
been treated could be used to void the policy for non-
disclosure, without violating HIPAA.
We asked some insurer subjects about a difficult, bor-
derline hypothetical situation involving hemochroma-
tosis. We asked whether, if a patient were found to have
elevated iron levels but at a level that does not require
clinical treatment, could the patient be regarded as hav-
ing a preexisting condition based on a genetic test that
confirmed that the cause of the elevated iron is hemo-
chromatosis. All five insurers consistently said yes, es-
pecially if the physician diagnoses the patient as now
having hemochromatosis rather than simply being at risk
for the disease. The two regulators who were asked this
question puzzled over it and considered it to be a close
call that requires further deliberation, but they seemed
to lean in favor of the insurers’ view.
Thus, there is ample reason to take seriously the con-
cern that health insurers might begin to use presymp-
tomatic genetic testing results. As one genetic counselor
noted, the fact that such results haven’t been used much
to date fails to recognize how recently these tests have
come into clinical use, and how rapidly clinical use might
grow in the near future. Still, it is notable how discon-
nected these indications of potential use are from the
pattern of state laws that currently exists. Insurers’ and
agents’ responses to the various hypothetical questions
and general attitudes just described bear no relationship
to the pattern of laws across our study states, nor are
they related to the type of insurer represented. This mix
of positive and negative views is remarkably consistent
or randomly scattered across all study states and all seg-
ments of the insurance industry.
Knowledge of and Attitudes about the Law
A final way to assess the impact of these laws on the
extent of genetic discrimination is to determine insurers’
and agents’ awareness of the law and its perceived im-
pact on underwriting practices. All of the state insurance
regulators we spoke to were well aware of the relevant
state and federal laws. Although they sometimes stum-
bled on questions about the laws’ details, this is because
no enforcement issues have arisen under these laws and
so they have not been required to look at them closely.
In our interviews, regulators were able to quickly locate
and examine the state laws when we asked them to con-
sider more subtle or detailed questions.
In contrast, both agents and insurer subjects had only
spotty knowledge of these laws. Only 42% (10 of 24)
of agents had any awareness there is any genetic-specific
law, either state or federal, and almost none had basic,
accurate understanding of what state and federal laws
say about genetic discrimination in health insurance. In-
surance underwriters and actuaries did somewhat (but
not a lot), better. Fifty percent (10 of 20) knew there
was some genetic-specific legal restriction on under-
writing, but most had an imprecise or inaccurate un-
derstanding of what the law said. However, their un-
derstanding typically was over-broad, for instance,
assuming that the federal law has a broad prohibition,
or that state law prohibits the use of family history when
in fact it does not. These results can be compared with
a similar study in Minnesota of a law prohibiting genetic
discrimination in employment, which found widespread
lack of knowledge or inaccurate and imprecise knowl-
edge of the law among employment lawyers, occupa-
tional physicians, and human resource managers (Roth-
stein et al. 1998).
None of our subjects believed the genetic discrimi-
nation laws have changed underwriting practices for
health insurance. As noted above, we detected no
changes or differences in application forms for health
insurance, either before or after these laws, or between
states with and without the laws. Also, none of the na-
tional insurers said that their underwriting practices var-
ied among states according to these laws. Instead, they
all consistently decline to seek or use genetic test infor-
mation in any state. Only one subject suggested that, if
genetic information were to be used under the various
hypothetical situations we presented, this use might dif-
fer among states according to what the law allows.
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To the extent these laws have had any impact, they
appear to have deterred health insurers that might be
inclined to use genetic information from even consid-
ering doing so. Insurers are split on the legitimacy of
using this information. Some believe that this is not mor-
ally or philosophically acceptable, whereas others simply
see this as a business judgment of whether the economic
and political costs of acquiring and using the informa-
tion are outweighed by the actuarial benefits. Thus, these
laws appear to have had some impact in reinforcing the
industry’s more socially oriented instincts. Subjects with
five insurers said their company’s practice of not using
genetic information was in part a response to a hostile
legal environment. These subjects have a general sense
there are legal problems with using genetic information,
and this reinforced their decision not to use this infor-
mation or go down that path. However, these percep-
tions and reactions are undifferentiated among the states
and, as noted above, insurers often overestimate the pro-
hibitive impact of these laws.
Adverse Consequences of Banning the Use of Genetic
Information
We also investigated two potential negative effects of
these laws. One is whether, by barring insurers from
using potentially relevant or important underwriting in-
formation, these laws cause adverse selection. The other
is whether these laws make it more difficult for people
to purchase insurance by preventing them from using
favorable genetic test results to establish their good
health.
Adverse selection is a term used to describe a situation
where insurers do not know as much as applicants do
about their risk status. When this situation arises, it can
be expected that high risk people will purchase a dis-
proportionate amount of insurance. The problem this
creates is not simply a threat to insurers’ profits. When
insurers expect or experience adverse selection, they are
forced to raise their rates across the board to anticipate
it, because they aren’t able to identify those at higher
risk whose rates they should selectively increase. Raising
everyone’s rates compounds the problem, however, by
making insurance less attractive to lower risks. If they
drop coverage, average rates go even higher. In the most
extreme cases, adverse selection can cause rates to spiral
so high that no one wants to purchase the insurance and
so the market for that product entirely collapses. More
commonly, the market reaches an equilibrium in which
insurers can earn a reasonable return even with higher
risks in the pool, yet the price remains sufficiently at-
tractive to keep medium or lower risks in the pool. It is
impossible to avoid all aspects of adverse selection, be-
cause there are always some aspects of risk that motivate
insurance purchase yet that insurers cannot feasibly or
affordably discover. Low level adverse selection is no
more problematic for successful markets than are any
number of other minor market imperfections, such as
transaction costs and deficiencies in consumer knowl-
edge (Pauly 1985). However, any level of adverse selec-
tion will inevitably increase prices somewhat and there-
fore deter at least some purchasers.
Industry subjects expressed no concern about adverse
selection resulting from these laws. Even the insurers
with a possible interest in genetic information did not
raise adverse selection as the main reason for this inter-
est. Instead, they said they would use genetic information
only if doing so would give them a competitive advan-
tage, or if this were necessary to respond to their com-
petitors. This is a much milder response than saying that
this information is vital to a well-functioning market.
Adverse selection was raised as a potential concern with
respect to life insurance. Our subjects appeared to have
full confidence that health insurance would remain a
viable product even if insurers were prohibited from us-
ing genetic information, as long as the prohibition is
applied equally to their competitors. This is a classic
collective action situation in which everyone agrees
that not using genetic information is economically ac-
ceptable, but if any one firm starts to use the information
effectively, all the others will be forced to do likewise.
We also explored the adverse selection concern by ask-
ing genetic counselors whether they explicitly or implic-
itly encourage this behavior with their clients. Others
have reported that genetic counselors warn clients to
consider purchasing insurance before undergoing genetic
testing, and perhaps also advise them to simply drop the
insurance afterwards if they learn from the test results
that they don’t need it (Pokorski 1997). If true, this
would certainly increase the potential for adverse selec-
tion. A few counselors acknowledged that part of their
counseling was to advise clients to consider their finan-
cial situation, including their insurance, prior to testing;
however, they don’t stress this point very much and they
don’t suggest dropping insurance later. Only 2 of 11
informed consent forms we reviewed that address adult
onset conditions advise patients to consider getting in-
surance before testing. One says we encourage you to
maximize any life and health insurance coverage before
you enter this program (emphasis in original). Never-
theless, counselors said the focus of this discussion is
usually on life and disability insurance, rarely or never
on health insurance, because most patients already have
ample health insurance. Therefore, we saw no indication
that many or even a few people undergoing genetic test-
ing are buying health insurance in anticipation of re-
ceiving bad news.
The other potential harm of prohibiting the use of
genetic testing information is that people whose results
are favorable may be foreclosed from using this to their
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advantage. For instance, in a state that allows insurers
to consider family history but not genetic tests, the in-
surer might conclude, based on the less precise infor-
mation, that an applicant is at risk for a genetic con-
dition that genetic testing shows was not in fact
inherited. We inquired whether insurers would feel con-
strained by genetic discrimination legislation from con-
sidering the more accurate favorable test results if vol-
unteered by applicants. None of the few insurers we
asked had given these issues any thought, so it appears
that favorable use of genetic test results has not arisen
very often in real world situations. This follows from
the fact that insurers usually do not inquire into family
history of disease, and when they do they usually don’t
use this information to predict the future onset of new
disease conditions. Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly
some situations, such as Huntington disease, where fam-
ily history has been used adversely, and so this potential
exists. The few insurers and regulators who addressed
this issue all agreed that, logically, if the law prohibits
adverse use of genetic information, it also prohibits fa-
vorable use. The few regulators we asked tentatively
agreed with this interpretation.
Discussion
The Existence and Potential for Genetic Discrimination
Multiple, independent sources refuted, or were unable
to document, any substantial level of genetic discrimi-
nation by health insurers, either before or after the legal
prohibitions were enacted, or in states with or without
these laws. Thus, these laws have had little or no dis-
cernible impact on actual genetic discrimination by
health insurers because little or no such discrimination
is occurring. These findings contrast sharply with pre-
vious reports that genetic discrimination is extensive (Bil-
lings et al. 1992; Alper et al. 1994; Hudson et al. 1995;
Geller et al. 1996; Lapham et al. 1996). Because of this
conflict, and because of the inherent difficulty in proving
the virtual absence of a problem, we will briefly review
the prior studies and summarize the credibility of our
sources.
Other studies that report genetic discrimination by
insurers have been criticized for overstating the extent
of discrimination (Reilly 1997; Volpe 1998). Various de-
fects in different studies include: nonrepresentative or
nongeneralizable sampling, using leading questions that
invite conclusions of discrimination, failing to distin-
guish among sources of discrimination, and including
both symptomatic and asymptomatic cases. Other stud-
ies, which correct many or all of these defects, conclude
that discrimination by health insurers is not widespread
based on information from presymptomatic genetic
tests. A 1994–95 survey of 500 primary care physicians
found only a few instances of refusals of employment
or life or health insurance based on presymptomatic
genetic information (Wertz 1997). A survey of 39 fragile-
X families in Colorado (most without affected individ-
uals) found that none had their health insurance canceled
or their premiums increased after the genetic diagnosis.
Although 6 (26%) of 23 families reported being turned
down when they applied for insurance, they each had
an affected individual and so did not present an asymp-
tomatic situation (Wingrove et al. 1996). A task force
in Ohio, after a thorough survey of insurers, agents,
advocacy groups and others, could find no examples of
genetic discrimination by health insurers (Ohio Depart-
ment of Insurance 1995). A survey of 49 health insurers
found that all but 1 (i.e., 98%) would insure someone
at 50% risk of having the HNPCC (i.e., hereditary non-
polyposis colorectal cancer) mutation for colon cancer
and 78% would not increase the premium or limit cov-
erage (Rodriguez-Bigas et al. 1998). Intermediate results
were reported from a survey of 103 commercial, HMO,
and Blue Cross insurers in 1991. It found that, for most
genetic conditions, almost no insurers would decline
coverage, exclude conditions, or increase rates based on
a family history of various genetic diseases (hemophilia,
sickle cell, cystic fibrosis, etc.). However, among various
groupings of insurers, 9%–36% would decline or limit
coverage for a family history of Huntington disease, and
36%–64% would do so if presymptomatic genetic test-
ing revealed the likelihood of a serious chronic future
disease (U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment
1992).
Our qualitative study is based on multiple perspectives
and methods. If health insurers were using presympto-
matic genetic test information against applicants or sub-
scribers to any significant extent, it would likely show
up in this sample of insurers, agents, and professionals
in medical genetics. The 29 genetic counselors inter-
viewed had 3 years of clinical practice, and many had
5 years. Included were the directors of genetic coun-
seling at some of the largest, most established, and most
prominent centers of medical genetics and research in
the country. Although this is the same community that
provided information for the earlier published reports
of genetic discrimination, our interviews are not neces-
sarily in contradiction, because we in fact heard a num-
ber of examples of adverse insurance consequences for
people with genetic conditions. But, our more detailed
evaluation indicates that, in the vast majority of cases,
these most likely are either based more on existing symp-
toms than on genetic information itself, or they relate
to other types of insurance besides health or are con-
cerned with payment for genetic services rather than the
availability and pricing of health insurance. These are
certainly issues of concern, but they are not the kinds
of adverse effects that these laws attempt to address.
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Insurers, agents, and regulators consistently verify this
account. Because of the suspicion with which many peo-
ple view the insurance industry, it is important to verify
the credibility of these potentially self-serving sources.
These subjects were interviewed at length by researchers
with knowledge and expertise in underwriting practices
and so who were in a good position to probe for more
detail and look for possible contradictions or confir-
mations. We judged these subjects to be candid and cred-
ible. On other points, many of these subjects were willing
to admit policies and behaviors that put them in some-
what negative light. Very few were defensive or evasive,
and many were extraordinarily forthcoming and helpful;
the remainder appeared to answer carefully but some-
what guardedly all the questions put to them. Also, the
insurer subjects were not spokespersons for their com-
panies who regularly do public relations or lobbying
work. Instead, these were career professional actuaries
and underwriters who approach these issues in a disci-
plined and objective fashion and who subscribe to a
widely regarded standard of professional integrity, much
like CPA accountants. Also, insurers’ accounts were con-
firmed by regulators and independent agents, whose in-
centives and outlook favor consumers.
These interviews were confirmed by independent and
objective sources of information, including a direct mar-
ket test and content analysis of application forms and
underwriting guidelines. If application forms do not ask
about genetic test results, and agents know not to vol-
unteer them, then it is unlikely that insurers will learn
about them with any regularity. If insurers order com-
plete copies of medical records, they might come across
references to genetic testing, but this is now rarely done
because of the expense. Also, medical geneticists are
careful about how they document these evaluations so
as to avoid unnecessarily calling attention to the genetic
component. Insurers might learn of genetic testing for
those they currently cover if policyholders submit the
testing and counseling for reimbursement under their
policy. However, insurers are not entitled to learn of the
test results, only the fact of testing.
This does not mean that health insurers never have
and never will engage in genetic discrimination. Two
application forms were discovered with somewhat am-
biguous questions asking about genetic conditions or
traits. Also, applicants might feel compelled to volunteer
information about genetic testing in response to generic
questions about any medical visits or tests of any kind.
The insurer whose form is quoted above, for instance,
asks During the past 5 years have you visited a medical
doctor . . . for diagnosis, advice, treatment, . . . or con-
sultation not previously explained? Learning the mere
fact of testing or evaluation can itself be very damaging
or prompt an insurer to make further inquiry, even if
the results are not initially revealed. If not prohibited by
law, once an insurer is put on notice, it might ask an
applicant or her physician a pointed question about ge-
netic information, which must be answered truthfully to
avoid insurance fraud. Also, some forms are designed
for both life and health insurance, when companies sell
both, and life insurers are more likely to ask about ge-
netic testing. Therefore, there is some opportunity for
health insurers to come across genetic information, and
when they do, there is some possibility they will use it
(U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment 1992).
We, in fact, documented a few cases of discrimination
based on family history.
However, these may well be isolated instances that
occurred because of lower level decisions by insurers that
do not reflect deliberate corporate policy. We heard of
several instances of patients who experienced initial in-
surance problems that insurers eventually corrected. The
institutional inertia or legal defensiveness that often re-
sults from justifying an initial decision may make these
isolated examples appear more purposeful and insistent
than is actually the case in established corporate policy
or regular practice. In our interviews, the explanation
that family history is used only occasionally and only to
obtain more information about existing conditions was
heard consistently throughout all parts of the industry
and from many credible sources. This was also con-
firmed by regulators and agents.
Nevertheless, there are several indications that health
insurers are interested in predicting future health prob-
lems. In response to hypothetical questions, some insurer
and agent subjects indicated that having a positive test
for BRCA1 or BRCA2 might have some, fairly marginal,
relevance in health underwriting, and most subjects con-
ceded that predictive genetic information will potentially
be much more relevant in the future. At present, insurers
sometimes increase rates for cholesterol levels and to-
bacco use. Although it was observed that both of these
indicators are very common and easy to evaluate, and
tobacco use has systemic effects on a broad range of
health conditions both in a near and far time span, the
same may be true one day for genetic predisposition.
Also, genetic predisposition can predict current as well
as future medical costs because of the cost of preventive
treatment and increased monitoring. Accordingly, ge-
netic predisposition, like high cholesterol and high blood
pressure, could become a diagnosable disease category
and so be viewed as an existing condition rather than
purely presymptomatic prediction. Thus, we do not en-
tirely dismiss the possibility that health insurers might
use predictive genetic information.
At present, the explanations of institutional policy op-
posed to genetic discrimination that we heard in inter-
views appear convincing for basic economic and statis-
tical reasons. Health insurers do not consider it very
relevant or worth the effort to predict health expendi-
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tures 5, 10, or more years into the future for specific
enrollees. This is especially true for relatively rare con-
ditions, for which little data exist. The dominant focus
of health underwriting is on near-term medical expenses.
These can be predicted with more certainty because over
time those who begin as higher or lower risks tend to
regress to the mean and because few people keep the
same health insurance for extended periods of time.
These basic economic and statistical facts differ sig-
nificantly for life insurance. It is much more typical to
hold onto a life insurance policy for a long time. If a
change is made, it is usually to add additional coverage
on top of older policies, rather than to replace existing
coverage. Accordingly, life insurance underwriting pre-
dicts mortality much further into the future, so predictive
genetic information is much more relevant to the life
underwriting frame of reference. Also, the potential is
much greater with life insurance for an adverse genetic
test to prompt someone to apply for more insurance
coverage. Therefore, it is not surprising or inconsistent
to observe that other studies indicate that life insurers
have a much stronger interest in knowing genetic test
results (McEwen et al. 1993).
The Impact of the Law on Industry Norms
What does one make of a set of laws that respond to
a problem that does not presently exist, that are widely
misunderstood or not known at all within the industry,
and that have little or no discernible effect? One is
tempted to conclude that genetic discrimination laws are
full of sound and fury signifying nothing, or are the
result of a Chicken Little syndrome by medical genet-
icists and advocacy groups. There is some merit in these
views. However, a more positive view is also justified:
There is some potential for health insurers to use genetic
information. These laws have solidified the industry’s
more socially constructive instincts and guarded against
socially destructive competitive forces by reinforcing an
industry norm that opposes the use of predictive, pre-
symptomatic information in general, and genetic infor-
mation in particular.
A useful theoretical framework to evaluate and ex-
plain the more psychological impact of these laws comes
from a growing body of work by prominent legal schol-
ars on the relationship between law and social norms.
Social and commercial systems often follow informal
norms that completely ignore, contradict, or markedly
differ from prevailing law (Ellickson 1991). This dis-
placement of law by social norms should usually be en-
couraged rather than criticized because social norms of-
ten reach a superior result than do legal rules, and they
activate informal enforcement mechanisms that are
cheaper and more effective than legal enforcement. In
other situations, laws and norms interact rather than
displace or compete with each other, so that laws often
express social values contained in informal norms. Law
can shape, create, communicate, or fortify norms (Sun-
stein 1996a, 1996b; Shapiro 1994).
This explanation assumes that, even when law has
little direct effect on social behavior, expressive or ed-
ucative laws still can help to alter behavior by shaping
social norms. A good example is laws requiring the use
of seat belts. Seat belt use has increased significantly after
enactment of these laws (Nelson et al. 1998), but this
is likely due more to the educative or norm-altering im-
pact of these laws than to simply their legal threat (Bon-
nie 1986; Field et al. 1993). Although people are oc-
casionally cited for not buckling up, it seems likely that
most people who comply do so because the new law
helped to educate people about safety concerns, or be-
cause the legal prohibition helped to shape a social norm
that rejects the prior libertarian attitude in favor of one
that regards failure to use seat belts as being socially
irresponsible. Thus, compliance occurs, not only because
of specific legal enforcement, but also because individual
and social attitudes now view not buckling up as
wrong—wrong not just under the law but according to
social norms.
An example of these interactions that relates to in-
surance is the discrediting of racial classification in all
lines of insurance, including health insurance. Wide-
spread condemnation of this practice in the 1970s led
to rapid and widespread change in industry practices,
followed by a spate of state legislation in the early 1980s
banning the use of race in all forms of insurance un-
derwriting. One attempting to measure the impact of
these laws might find almost none, because the insurance
industry had voluntarily ceased using racial factors prior
to many of these laws (Wortham 1986). However, no
one would say these laws are unwise or unjustified. They
express social condemnation and they help to ensure that
such practices are not revived. The push for legislation
helped to quickly reshape industry norms, and wide-
spread enactment of these laws fortified the new industry
norm.
Similarly, genetic discrimination laws have not
changed industry behavior but they have helped to pre-
serve the status quo. Even though insurers and agents
do not have widespread and accurate knowledge of these
laws, these laws have fortified their impression of social
disapproval by creating a general climate of legal con-
demnation. Health insurers avoid the use of genetic in-
formation not so much because of the specific threat of
law but because the law reinforces the instinct that doing
otherwise would be socially wrong. Therefore, health
insurers that might be tempted to consider using genetic
information have stayed clear of this arena because of
an undifferentiated and imprecise sense that it is legally
problematic, and insurers that are more philosophically
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committed to not using this information are not placed
in the dilemma of having to respond to competitors that
might be tempted to do so.
The insurance industry struggles with competing
norms of actuarial fairness and social fairness (Abraham
1986a, 1986b). Actuarial fairness says that insurers not
only may, but should, use the best information about
risk that is available in order to accurately reflect each
person’s risk status. Social fairness says that certain types
of risk classification unfairly penalize people for factors
they cannot control or for which they should not be held
responsible. Usually in these debates the industry is univ-
ocal in attempting to defend the norm of actuarial fair-
ness; this occurred, for instance, with AIDS testing (Iuc-
ulano 1987). However, in this instance, as with racial
discrimination, laws prohibiting health insurers from us-
ing genetic information have helped move the industry
norm toward social fairness. Whether this has any actual
or potential impact on insurers’ behavior is not known,
however, because insurers were not using presympto-
matic genetic information prior to these laws.
Potential Harm
Whether or not these laws, on balance, are a success
depends also on an appreciation of their potential harms.
It is clear from our interviews that serious adverse se-
lection has not resulted, and is not likely to result soon,
with respect to health insurance. This conclusion follows
from the prior observations that health insurers do not
consider this information important or useful. Barring
insurers from using information they do not consider
important for underwriting obviously cannot signifi-
cantly undermine their ability to counter adverse selec-
tion. What is more telling is that most health under-
writers and actuaries seem perfectly content to accept
this ban, both now and far into the future. Many ob-
served that these risks are already in the market, so keep-
ing things the way they are now is not likely to harm
the market. By inference, they seemed to suggest (al-
though we did not ask them this) that there is not a large
number of people without insurance and at high genetic
risk who are waiting to enter the market as soon as they
learn their genetic status. In this regard, health insurance
differs markedly from life insurance. Many more people
lack substantial life insurance, and those with life in-
surance are able to buy much more coverage if they learn
they are at increased health risk. There is only so much
health insurance coverage any one person can buy, and
most people are already fully covered or unable to afford
coverage regardless of their health status.
Another possible harm is the potential for preventing
favorable use of genetic test results. Many of the laws
enacted so far do not differentiate favorable from un-
favorable use but instead prohibit any use of genetic
information by health insurers. This is how regulators
and underwriters interpret the law, although we only
asked a few of them. But how great is the potential for
favorable use? None of our insurer or agent subjects
knew of genetic information being used in this way, but
several insurers, all of those who spoke to the issue, said
that favorable use of genetic information is possible and
plausible, just as much as the possibility of unfavorable
use. The strongest confirmation came from genetic coun-
selors. They gave several instances of clients who had
been able to counter adverse family history or misleading
clinical indicators by using genetic tests to show the ab-
sence of suspected genetic disease.
A few states with genetic discrimination laws explicitly
allow favorable use of genetic information, and some
others appear to ban only adverse use. Underwriters,
however, explain that they cannot look only at the pos-
itive side of a potential source of information. They must
either consider both sides, or disregard it altogether. This
is not only dictated by insurers’ notions of what is fair,
but by practical realities. Consider, for instance, allowing
younger applicants to disclose their age but prohibiting
insurers from inquiring about age. Insurers would simply
assume that anyone who does not volunteer the infor-
mation is not young. Therefore, states that want to pre-
clude age discrimination in rating must prohibit any con-
sideration of age, both positive and negative.
Whether the same holds true for genetic information
depends on how prevalent it is and whether family his-
tory can be considered. For a single, rare condition, it
may be feasible to consider only favorable test infor-
mation because the background risk for the general pop-
ulation is minimal. However, if family history is not
being considered, a favorable genetic test for a single
disease has almost no impact on one’s risk profile, unless
it counters misleading clinical indicators. Even when
many more genetic conditions become identifiable, dis-
tinct genetic risk classes still might not emerge because
almost everyone will likely have a number of different
elevated risks. We may someday reach a point where
significant portions of the population will be able to
demonstrate they are genetically favored. Then, allowing
favorable use would undermine the goal of preventing
wide scale genetic discrimination. Moreover, in states
that allow family history to be considered, allowing in-
surers to consider favorable test results would increase
the salience of family history for those who do not vol-
unteer favorable test results and perhaps increase the
potential for genetic discrimination. In short, it is wishful
thinking to suppose that genetic discrimination can be
prevented without inhibiting the use of favorable test
results.
A final concern expressed by two insurers is that pro-
hibiting managed care insurers from using genetic in-
formation might make it more difficult to pursue proper
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medical management of possible genetic disorders,
through aggressive monitoring and preventive measures.
They were concerned that the prohibition on the un-
derwriting side would be extended to the clinical side of
a managed care insurer. This is only a speculative pos-
sibility, however, and does not necessarily result from
the wording of these laws. It does suggest the possibility,
however, that genetic information in clinical records
could leak to the underwriting side if there are not suf-
ficient internal protections (Kotval 1998). However, this
is mainly a concern only for renewals and rate increases
for existing subscribers, and general consumer protec-
tions are stronger in these situations than for people
initially applying for insurance. Also, most HMOs do
not participate in the Medical Information Bureau
(which is used mainly by life insurers) and so informa-
tion in either their clinical or their underwriting files is
not likely to be shared with other health insurers. The
connection between the clinical and the underwriting
spheres of managed care insurers deserves more atten-
tion, however.
On balance, although the harms from genetic discrim-
ination laws are not significant, that is because genetic
information simply is not much used by health insurers,
for either adverse or favorable purposes. But, once ad-
verse uses become possible, so too do favorable ones.
At that point, the potential for inhibiting favorable use
by clinicians or by those who wish to clear up a suspect
family or medical history becomes real, and this poten-
tial seems to be roughly as great as the potential for
these laws to protect against adverse use.
Conclusion
Laws prohibiting health insurers’ use of presympto-
matic genetic information were enacted to address the
growing concerns that unfair genetic discrimination was
occurring and that this was deterring beneficial genetic
testing. Here, we show that the first concern was not
well founded, confirming some studies but refuting oth-
ers. Health insurers have little reason to consider future
disease states, whether genetic or not, for asymptomatic
people and, in fact, have not done so to any great extent,
either before or after these laws. Nevertheless, there is
some indication that these laws have affected health in-
surers’ attitudes about the social legitimacy of using pre-
symptomatic genetic information and, therefore, they
may deter such use in the future. Once these laws become
more relevant, however, they may also begin to inhibit
other legitimate social and clinical objectives.
Some people may speculate that, by settling for a
largely symbolic victory, proponents of these laws have
diverted attention from more comprehensive reforms
that would achieve universal coverage, but this is highly
unlikely and impossible to know. What is more likely is
that, at the same time these laws communicated social
disapproval to insurers, they may have caused patients
and geneticists, without a substantial basis, to take more
seriously the threat of discrimination. The ideal protec-
tive law would both prevent discrimination without
causing excessive collateral harms, and would convey an
accurate sense of reassurance. It appears so far that these
laws have achieved the first purpose but not the second.
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